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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

Addendum

1. Following my report of 3 May 1994 (S/1994/529), the members of the Security Council will have taken note of the letter dated 17 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations (S/1994/583), transmitting a copy of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 by the parties to the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia (ibid., annex I).

2. In that Agreement the parties agreed that a peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would be deployed to monitor compliance with the Agreement. The parties also appealed to the United Nations Security Council to "expand the mandate of the United Nations military observers in order to provide for their participation in the operations" envisaged under the Agreement.

3. Between 23 and 26 May 1994, the Secretariat held a series of technical discussions with representatives of the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The purpose of those discussions was to obtain, as a first step towards formulating my recommendations to the Security Council, clarifications on the possible role of United Nations military observers and their relationship with the CIS peace-keeping force envisaged in the Agreement. Consultations with the parties themselves will, of course, be necessary before such recommendations can be finalized.

4. During the discussions, the Secretariat was informed that references in the Agreement to "military observers" or any other observers denoted United Nations military observers. The Secretariat was further advised that the proposed CIS peace-keeping force and the United Nations military observers, should the Security Council authorize the deployment of the latter, were intended to function as two separate and independent operations, each under its own command, but in close cooperation and coordination with each other.

5. A number of further clarifications were provided by the Russian delegation. On the question of freedom of movement of the CIS peace-keeping force and of

United Nations military observers outside the security zone (para. 2 (f) of the Agreement), the Secretariat was advised that the original Russian text denotes that such movement "will be agreed upon" or "will be coordinated" with the parties, rather than "shall be subject to agreement" with the parties, as it appears in the English text. Further, the CIS peace-keeping force will be prepared to undertake the monitoring of "the coastal waters and airspace between lines A and D" instead of United Nations military observers undertaking these tasks, as envisaged in paragraph 2 (g) of the Agreement.

6. On the basis of these and other clarifications and information provided, including aspects of the concept of operations of the proposed CIS peace-keeping force, I intend to examine further, in consultation with the parties and the Russian Federation, expansion of the mandate and size of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) with a view to its undertaking certain tasks independently but in close coordination with the CIS peace-keeping force.

7. Should the Security Council so decide, it is envisaged that the mandate of an expanded UNOMIG could be as follows:

(a) To monitor the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, signed by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on 14 May 1994, and to observe the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force deployed under the Agreement;

(b) To investigate violations of the Agreement and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved;

(c) To maintain close contacts with both sides to the conflict, the CIS peace-keeping force and any other military contingents of the Russian Federation and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons;

(d) To report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its mandate including, in particular, violations of the Agreement and any development relevant to the efforts of the United Nations to promote a comprehensive political settlement.

8. Based on such a mandate, my provisional assessment is that the strength of UNOMIG might be of the order of 150 military observers, with appropriate civilian support staff.

9. UNOMIG would function as an independent operation but would maintain close cooperation and coordination with the CIS peace-keeping force at the headquarters, sector and liaison team levels. In determining the geographical deployment of UNOMIG, the deployment of the CIS peace-keeping force would be taken into consideration. Decisions affecting both UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force would be made through consultation. Should a joint military commission be established by the CIS peace-keeping force and the parties, UNOMIG would participate in its meetings.

10. Within the area of its deployment, the CIS peace-keeping force would also take appropriate measures for the safety of the United Nations military observers. The Secretariat has been further advised that the CIS peace-keeping force would undertake mine clearance and such engineering works as needed to facilitate its operation.

11. It is anticipated that the initial deployment of the CIS peace-keeping force may take place in the very near future. I would welcome an early indication of the views of the members of the Security Council on the general approach outlined above. Subject to such views it would be my intention, as a first step and in consultation with the parties, to increase the number of military observers of UNOMIG to 55, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 892 (1993). The Secretariat would also engage in further urgent consultations with the parties and the Russian Federation, on the basis of which I would submit my detailed recommendations on the expansion of UNOMIG.